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How can entrepreneurship education influences cofounders’ nepo-
tism and cronyism definition? 
Abstract 
This study presents an analysis of how can entrepreneurship education influence nepotism and crony-
ism in entrepreneurship. The aggregated dimensions of this problem results in extended factors are 
also observed in this study: the importance of venture capitalist in the entrepreneurship process, the 
impact of business cycles in the ventures decision making and the extended-household capital. The 
increase of the knowledge-based economy in Portugal is also influencing the entrepreneurship envi-
ronment context. All of the previous are observed under the perspective of the impact resulting of the 
entrepreneurship education in cofounders' nepotism and cronyism definitions. 
Keywords: nepotism; cronyism; entrepreneurship; entrepreneurship education; agency; stewardship; 
business cycle; investors; exit plan; 
Introduction 
Cofounder’s nepotism and cronyism can influence team building on ventures. Nepotism is a common 
hiring mechanism in family business, usually when companies use their influence to hire family mem-
bers, although cronyism as being less common. This can miss their influence among co-founders, 
especially if we consider Distelberg’s household definition, where family and friend members are con-
sidered. 
 Driven by the emergence of the knowledge-based economy, Portugal is one of the countries influ-
enced by entrepreneurship trend. Several factors are determinant to influence the entrepreneurs’ be-
havior over the stakeholders.  
To address the research question of “How can entrepreneurship education influences cofounders’ 
nepotism and cronyism definition?”, this study explores the entrepreneurship ecosystem strategy to 
change an economy into knowledge-based economy, which requires articulated policies and actions. 
Entrepreneurship education program can be relevant to create a change on the valuation of the entre-
preneurs about the entrepreneurship ecosystem. To address the knowledge-based economy, the Eu-
ropean entrepreneurship ecosystem was promoted by the European Commission through incentives 
to boost entrepreneurship by implementing key European Union (EU) policies (European Council, 
2000). Countries that later joined the EU have adopted the recommendations of the European eco-
nomic-social model (Macrometria, 2014). As a sense making, the Lisbon European council encour-
ages the knowledge creation and deployment aiming Europe to improve the economy and social per-
formance for the ensuing decades, in order to transform the European region in the a competitive 




This study considers the EU initiatives, which promote the entrepreneurship ecosystem that involves 
important stakeholders related with the economy, such as government, schools, universities, educa-
tion institutions and other (Alípio, 2006; European Council, 2000). Moreover, higher learning institu-
tions are now offering core entrepreneurship programs or elective courses as a major subject 
(Teixeira, 2012), which can enhance the influence of the entrepreneurship education over the defini-
tion about nepotism and cronyism, venture capitalists, and business cycle among the knowledge-
based economy stakeholders.  
Concerning financial investment, in the context of this study, it can be critical for entrepreneurs in the 
early stage of the ventures, especially over the human-capital for the propose of the venture. In con-
sequence, the study explores the financial investment from family and friends to venture capitalists. 
The newest professional funding source for the entrepreneurs are venture capitalists, such as busi-
ness angels and venture capital. In one hand, venture capitalists are usually expected to create jobs 
and leverage the economy, and they are usually well positioned to bring capital through their ability to 
influence with their networking (Zider, 1998). In the other hand, an innovation cycle can be created by 
the financial investment cycle (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013), which can be a key factor to influence 
the entrepreneurship ecosystem. In this context, companies’ managers can face influence on share-
holder’s assembly configuration, employment policies, suppliers, investment and others stakeholders. 
The research also reveals the importance of business cycles over the entrepreneurship education. 
Flows of financial capital into the market have a positive correlation with the economic phases (Paik 
and Woo, 2013). The phase of the economic cycle may be relevant to start a company (Svaleryd, 
2015). Research shows the key role that entrepreneurs play in the economy, by creating jobs, com-
mercialize innovation, accumulating savings and wealth and drive economy growth (Parker, 2012).  
This research was conducted in Portugal during the Southern Europe economic and social crisis that 
came in consequence of the European crisis in 2009. This crisis influenced the households’ capital 
and the financial sector, which directly influence all the economy, and can heavily shake the structure 
of the companies. In consequence of the business recession, unemployment rose, financial institu-
tions restricted loans to their customers and social instability rose (Hinton, 2010). 
Accordingly, this paper focuses on the clarification of the four main aggregated dimensions identified 
(Annex 1) on the research that can guide the cofounders’ management decisions over nepotism and 
cronyism context. This study explores an Nepotism/cronyism entrepreneurship model (Annex 2) where 
nepotism and cronyism definition can be strongly influenced by entrepreneurship education, which 
persuades the sensitivity about cofounders’ nepotism, cronyism, investors relationships, business 
cycles and household capital. 
To achieve the set of goals, this paper is organized in the following way. First, a brief overview over 
the entrepreneurship education governmental policies, which promoted the entrepreneurship ecosys-
tem to situate the ground of the knowledge-based economy, and then the review of the literature relat-
ed with the aggregated dimensions. Second, the methodology selected and the criteria used. The 
research approach uses a qualitative grounded-theory, based on semi-structured expert interviews to 
understand how entrepreneurship education can influence cofounders’ management of the company, 




informants, and perspective into the contexts about cofounders’ household-members, which can influ-
ence the management of the company. Third, how this paper contributes to the literature about entre-
preneurship on knowledge base economy, by developing an Nepotism/cronyism entrepreneurship 
model (Annex 2) that shows why Entrepreneurial Education is relevant to change the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, where the cofounders are the key players. Using the case of entrepreneurship education, 
the study uncover the influence into nepotism, cronyism by extended-household capital, venture capi-
talists, and business cycles understanding. Changing those perceptions indicates generalized social 
exchange relationships between cofounders. In conclusion, the new perspective of how nepotism and 
cronyism among cofounders can influence the entrepreneurship ecosystem described in this paper 
opens the opportunity for future research. 
Literature Review 
The nepotism is a common hiring mechanism policing in family business, usually when companies use 
their influence to hire family members, although cronyism as being less common (Jones and Stout, 
2015). That can miss the influence of nepotism and cronyism between cofounders. To address the 
research question, this literature review covers the influence of the entrepreneurship education into 
the definition of the nepotism and cronyism among cofounders. At the beginning of this review, it is 
important to understand extend-household, nepotism and cronyism concepts. Then, having the entre-
preneurship education as a trigger in the research question, this review goes along to explore the mo-
tivation of governmental policies for this education revolution and the consequences in the entrepre-
neurship ecosystem. After, considering the Nepotism/cronyism entrepreneurship model (Annex 2), the 
review goes to venturing capitalist, business cycles and stewardship/agency analyses, because they 
can impact on the definition of nepotism and cronyism concepts. 
The impact of extended-household members’ human capital on nepotism and cronyism 
The relationship between family-members and friends is explored in Distelberg’s research, which con-
tributes with the definition of family: “All individuals related by blood, marriage, or adoption are typically 
considered family. But individuals not related through blood, marriage, or adoption but who share 
goals, resources, and a commitment to the whole may also be considered family” (Distelberg and 
Sorenson, 2009). For the purpose of this paper, I named as extended-household, the concept of 
household considering the extension of the family members described by Distelberg. Following this 
concept, family or non-family-members can function as family-members, which can influence the 
household capital. 
In another perspective, Rodriguez (2009) considers household capital quite close to family capital, and 
he defines “Just as family capital is a component of social capital, household capital is a further speci-
fied part of family capital that may include individuals not related to the family.” Complementary re-
search analyzes the correlation of the household characteristics in the formation of a new venture, 
(Rodriguez et al., 2009). Establishing how household capital can influence the startup creation, Rodri-
guez findings reveal that the potential of the household financial capital is positively related with its 




decision to launch a venture. Also, social capital considering extend-household human capital may 
facilitate entrepreneurship, especially when competencies are organized to launch the venture. The 
early structure of the startup should support entrepreneurs with specific knowledge, human resource, 
information, market and networking which can address other resources needed in the venture. Ex-
tend-household human capital combined with management competencies, the potential of the venture 
structure can predict the success of the ventures (Rodriguez et al., 2009). 
The influence of nepotism and cronyism on company management 
Concerning the social relationship among entrepreneurs and its stakeholders, it is relevant to under-
stand the concept of nepotism and cronyism. Nepotism is a preference of an owner or a manager for 
hiring family-members instead of an independent candidate (Jones, 2004). Nepotism is common in 
family companies, where families use their control in the hiring process to perpetuate family involve-
ment over time and across generations (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013). Jaskiewicz identified two type of 
nepotism, reciprocal and entitlement nepotism. Reciprocal nepotism is related to three family condi-
tions: interdependence, extent of exchanges and norms that support obligations to family-members. 
Among family-members in family-business, these three conditions can lead to “generalized social ex-
change relationships”, which are relevant to effective “tacit knowledge management”. Jaskiewicz pro-
poses that reciprocal nepotism can improve a company’s ability to engage in “tacit knowledge man-
agement”, which can enhance the company’s competitive advantage. In the opposite, entitlement 
nepotism happened without concerns of family conditions. This can lead to “restricted social exchang-
es” among family-members in family-business, which can miss synergies among family-members 
(Jaskiewicz et al., 2013). Cronyism is close to nepotism, but instead of involving family-members, it 
involves one friend to another by actual and perceived preferences (Jones and Stout, 2015). General-
ized exchange relationships are a form of social capital and reciprocal nepotism is a process through 
which families can use that social capital to the benefit of the company (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013).  
According to Salvato, research on family business has usually tried to find pros and cons on family 
involvement. The results are diversified and contradictory, and in spite of the numerous research on 
this subject, no conclusion remains on whether family ownership and family management are good or 
bad for a business (Salvato et al., 2012).  
Knowledge-based economy over the entrepreneurship education 
Nowadays, economies are adapting to be more knowledge based, supported that the value of the 
knowledge is a vital component of productivity and economic growth. Karagiannis mentioned that, one 
of the fourth important influence of this change is the scientific and technological advances, which 
have emerged by the increase of resources on R&D (Karagiannis, 2007). Eid reveals that R&D pro-
moted by higher education is positively correlated with productivity and economic growth (Eid, 2012). 
Encouraged by the European Union, Portugal addressed the process to change the economy to the 
knowledge-based economy, to aim this change polices and actions were required. These policies and 
actions may be critical to have ambitious policies for the information and communication technologies, 
education, research and development, economy competitiveness, purchasing power and consump-




The European entrepreneurship ecosystem was promoted by the European Commission through in-
centives to boost entrepreneurship by implementing key European Union (EU) policies. The Lisbon 
European Council, launched by the European government leaders, signaled an agenda to introduce 
reforms on employment and productivity in Europe. The Lisbon European Council recommended to 
the EU countries the creation of policies (sense making) based on knowledge and innovation to im-
prove the competitiveness and economic growth, and allowing the transition to knowledge-based 
economies (European Council, 2000). Countries that later joined the European Union, including Por-
tugal, have adopted the recommendation of the European economic-social model. As a consequence, 
of sense making, European countries developed a national educational programs for entrepreneurship 
to foster the entrepreneur education ecosystem, as a sense giving (Pereira et al., 2007).  
The Lisbon European council encourages the knowledge creation and deployment to improve the 
economic and social performance in Europe for the following decades, in order to transform the Euro-
pean region in the world economy (European Council, 2000). The council strategy defines a plan of 
reforms for the European society by implementing policies to leverage the information society and 
R&D and by creating an accelerating platform to enhance competitiveness, innovation in the market-
place. There were executed macroeconomic European reforms and policies to harmonize the Europe-
an Union countries strategies to build knowledge infrastructures, enhancing innovation and economic 
reform, and modernizing social welfare and education systems (European Council, 2000). 
Entrepreneurship education and the entrepreneurial intentions 
Reveals in Raposo and do Paço (2011) study, the entrepreneurship educational system influences the 
knowledge base, achievement of skills, competences and attitudes that can influence the career 
choices. Education can open the horizons of the students by giving them better equipment to perceive 
opportunities and risks. Also the knowledge acquired can be used to pursue opportunities, by genera-
tion new ideas and found the needed resources, including human capital resources recruitment 
(Raposo and do Paço, 2011). Bartoš research reveals that there is significant difference in the atti-
tudes of the entrepreneurs who have entrepreneurship education, which is positively correlated with 
the effective launch of a business and its success (Bartoš et al., 2015; Matlay, 2008). 
The EU initiatives to promote the entrepreneurship ecosystem involve relevant stakeholders that are 
related to the economy, such as government, educational institutions, venture capitalists, startup incu-
bators and other players (Alípio, 2006; European Council, 2000). As consequence of these incentives 
from the government, there has been a focus in developing entrepreneurial talent, which has stimulat-
ed entrepreneurship education in learning institutions, from kindergartens to universities. Additionally, 
more higher learning institutions are now offering core entrepreneurship programs or elective courses 
as a major subject (Matlay, 2008; Teixeira, 2012).  
The Macrometria report reveals that the qualification of the startup’s entrepreneurs is higher than the 
average level of the labor force in Portugal. In the Portuguese incubators network, the percentage of 
people that have completed a Bachelor, Masters or PhD degree is greater than 80%, as compared to 
the overall workforce in Portugal which is a mere 20%. The Macrometria study reveals that qualified 
persons tend to be more competitive and confident to create a new company than a low skilled work-




as well as family and friends that also provide them with valuable household capital to create a profit-
able enterprise (Macrometria, 2014). 
Regarding entrepreneurship education, according to Hisrich, from 1996 to 2006 there was a significant 
increase in demand for courses about entrepreneurship. To address this gap, educational institutions 
have increased the number of entrepreneurship courses at both the first degree (undergraduate) and 
advanced degree (graduate) levels. Hisrich research discloses that in the seventies there were only 
sixteen education institutes in the world teaching entrepreneurship, while in 2006 there were more 
than 2200 courses in entrepreneurship being taught in 1600 institutions around the world. Additionally, 
research in entrepreneurship had a corresponding increase in educational courses, reflected in about 
44 refereed journals in 2004 (Hisrich, 2006). 
In another perspective, Cheng study shows that for entrepreneur education the most common method 
is via lectures with more interactive approach, by using case studies, guest speakers and interaction 
with successful entrepreneurs (Cheng et al., 2009). The research from Jaafar reveals that the entre-
preneurship education in the university is positively related with the probability that students consider 
themselves to be entrepreneurs (Jaafar and Aziz, 2008). In spite of the importance of the entrepre-
neurs’ education, educational institutions are more structured to help people finding new ideas over 
launching new ventures. Entrepreneurs are aware that educational institutions, and also companies, 
have limitation because of their strategic plan and financial structure, vis-à-vis the venture capitalists, 
which are focused on entrepreneurship investment (Zider, 1998). 
Venture capitalist over the management team 
Following the education programs, to increase de awareness of the entrepreneurs education pro-
grams usually address the importance of the venture capitalists (Valerio et al., 2014).  
In the investor perspective, with the increasing complexity of resources needed and competition in the 
marketplace, solo founder decreases the probability of success of the venture. In the another way, the 
cofounders team plays a key role in the ventures’ valuation by venture capitalists (Franke et al., 2008). 
Considering nepotism and cronyism aspects, Miloud study reveals that the quality of the founder and 
top management team of a new venture, significantly and positively, affect its valuation by investors, 
often when cofounders seeks venture capital financing in early venture's stage (Miloud et al., 2012). 
Research shows that there is evidence that an increase on availability of venture capital affects posi-
tively new ventures (Deville, 2002). Regarding nepotism and cronyism, the investment projects in the 
early stage of the ventures resources are usually supported by entrepreneurs’ extended household-
members, family-members and friends. Macrometria report shows that in Startup Lisboa family and 
friends investment represented 32%, which is higher than in other world regions. In the North of Eu-
rope, it represents 25% and in Silicon Valley 22%. In Startup Lisboa venture capital and business an-
gels only appear in third place with about 20%, while in Silicon Valley they represent more than 50%. 
Regardless of this difference, results show a positive sign, considering the numbers from the small 
relative size of business angels and venture capital investors in Portugal (Macrometria, 2014).  
Investment and venturing are expected to create jobs and leverage the economy (Paik and Woo, 




to bring capital, through their ability to influence with their networking. Venture capitalists are usually 
looking for good managers in their dedicated business segment. For venture capitalists, cofounders 
valuation is related with their industry, role, skills, risk-taken, reputation in the sector and ability to sell 
themselves. The entrepreneur who can fit this conditions is in a good position to deal with venture 
capitalists (Zider, 1998). After family and friends, the main professional funding source for the entre-
preneurs are business angels, which typically contribute with seed capital (small quantity of capital), 
advice and with experience on the sector. After the first round in funding, the next funding source may 
come from venture capital, which has a key role in the consolidation phase of the company, when 
firms typically begin to commercialize their product or services (EVCA, 2007). 
The impact of external investors is showed in the Wasserman study. New entrepreneurs aim to be a 
star like Google, Tesla or Microsoft founders, which built large companies and led them for many 
years. However, a successful founder who managed a company on the top for many years is an ex-
ception in our world, based on the study “The founder’s dilemma” (Wasserman, 2003). He found that 
most of the entrepreneurs did not stay for a long time in their leading positions, especially when their 
established companies turned into public corporations. According to Noam’s study, by the time that 
new companies were three years old, only 50% of the founders were in the leading position and with 
four years old only 40% were there to fill the position as a CEO. Things get worse when companies 
come public: only 25% of the founders led their companies in an initial public offering. Noam also 
found other researchers who have subsequently realized similar trend in other industries and in other 
period of time (Wasserman, 2003).  
Based on EVCA, European Private Equity & Venture capital Association, companies valuation de-
pends on several factors, including business plan, assets owned, management team capital, employ-
ees capital, and other criteria (EVCA, 2007). 
Business cycle over the extend-household human capital 
Concerning nepotism and cronyism, what is particularly impacted by business cycles? The extended-
household members can be affected by the economic cycle (Allas, 2011) and, in consequence, it can 
be reflected on the extended-household human capital, which can be reflected on related ventures. 
Regarding the relation between business cycles and entrepreneurship, Parker resumes the growing 
importance of the subject in the following way: “The financial crisis of 2008 together with the great 
recession that followed it have refocused economists’ attention on the determinants of business cycles 
and recessions. It seems that the need to understand the deep economic causes of business cycles is 
no less pressing now than it was at the time of the great depression. Arguably, what is different now is 
the importance that policy-makers attach to entrepreneurship as a source of (economic) growth and 
recovery” (Parker, 2012). Recent research shows the key role that entrepreneurs play in the economy 
is by creating jobs, commercializing innovations, accumulating savings and wealth and driving econo-
my growth (Parker, 2012). 
In other way, Paik and Woo study explores how economic cycles affect the fluctuation of the amount 
of financial capital available into venture capitalists. The flows of financial capital into the market have 




ists shift the type of startup where they invest, considering risk and innovation, according to the eco-
nomic upturn or downturn. (Paik and Woo, 2013).  
The innovative entrepreneurs may have to consider the economic cycle phases to make strategic 
decisions and to determine when it is better to enter into the market. Paik and Woo research shows 
that companies that were founded during the recession period show better performance  (Paik and 
Woo, 2013). Findings show also that the innovation cycle can be created by the financial investment 
cycle and understanding the relation between investment cycle and commercialization of a new tech-
nology cycle can be determinant for policy makers (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013). In the social-
economic perspective, starting a company in downturn may be a way to avoid unemployment, howev-
er this opportunity may be limited by the amount of human and financial capital of the enterprising 
candidate (Svaleryd, 2015). Economic cycles phases may be relevant to start a company as in eco-
nomic upturn there are new business opportunities to encourage new companies (Svaleryd, 2015). 
Concerning the impact on extended-household knowledge capital from the business cycle, the produc-
tivity and the economic cycle in UK support that personal skill have direct impact from the business 
cycle (Allas, 2011). Allas’s work shows that, even with the decrease of the full time students graduat-
ing with first degree since the economic cycle peak of 2003-04, the number of these graduates in-
creased marginally during the recession year of 2008-009, compared to the pre-recession year of 
2004-05 through 2007-008. Additionally, there was a continuing increase in the number of students 
who graduated with other undergraduate degrees and qualifications, from 45,525 in 2006-07 to 51,975 
in 2008-09. Allas’s findings are aligned with the information that suggests that there has been a sharp 
rose in the demand over universities studies during the recession period and that tendency has re-
mained to the next economic phase, recovery economic phase (Hinton, 2010). 
Additionally, based in Hinton, about U.S. economic cycles, there are several sectors in the economy 
that receive a higher impact from the economic cycle, like transportation, manufacturing, construction, 
financial services, commercial real estate services, hotels, luxury and education. Hinton describe that 
some education institutions usually sees an increase in enrollment during the recession phase, in con-
sequence of a poor job offer, which incentives students to view continuing education more favorably. 
Hinton also mentioned that during the 2001 recession, enrollment increased, doubled, at four-year for-
profit education institutions. And during the first years of recessions, over the last decades, the enroll-
ment in two-year education programs grew by an average of 12% (Hinton, 2010).  
Stewardship and agency on extended-household employment 
Regarding self-interest and commitment over an entrepreneurship, it is important to understand the 
stewardship and agency concepts on the venture creation, because in startups usually the members 
are family or friends (Bygrave and William, 2004).  
This analyses considers family in the context of the extend-household members, which include family 
and friend. Agency theory tends to focus on the contract relationship between the principal and the 
agent, where the principal are the business’s owners and the agents are the managers. The agency 
literature on nonfamily companies give attention to explain the principal-agent contract, where the 




2015). In this form, family companies might enjoy a relative advantage because owners and managers 
are usually in the same side, which automatically align owner and manager interests. However, it is 
not irrelevant for family companies, because of how managers in family companies preserve the so-
cio-emotional wealth among family-members on the business in opposition to their companies perfor-
mance (Dodd and Dyck, 2015). Stewardship theory diminishes the assumptions of economic self-
interest and opportunism and suggests that people are also motivated to be generous and altruistic 
ideals. Academics tend to argue that stewardship practices are more common in family business than 
in nonfamily business (Dodd and Dyck, 2015).  
Education program can support cofounder’s interpretation of the duality stewardship vs. agency, 
where Cunha summarizes: “It might also be argued that sometimes the agency vs. stewardship de-
bate assumes an explicitly dualistic format, with stewardship representing right and agency represent-
ing wrong.” and he suggests otherwise that, “instead of seeing stewardship and agency as dualistic 
oppositions, it is more adequate to frame them conceptually as an opposing duality, i.e. as processes 
that contradict but also reinforce one another. “ (Cunha et al., 2016).  
Also considering nepotism and cronyism in the context of extend-household members in the venture, 
business education offer information to understand the relation between owners and managers, in-
creasing trust and lowering agency costs in this these relationships (Lansberg, 2015). 
Methodology 
The research question was answered through an inductive analysis of the topic (Thomas 2006). Expe-
riences were thus reported following the expert interviewees, informants, and perspective into the 
previously explained contexts about entrepreneurship education influences nepotism and cronyism 
definition. 
Research design 
The research approach uses a qualitative grounded-theory, since it was understood that it should be 
appropriate to generate a new interpretation. Briefly, grounded theory methods consist of systematic, 
however with flexible guidelines to collecting and analyzing quantitative data to construct theory 
“grounded” in its own data (Charmaz, 2006: 2:3). Grounded theory prompts taking a fresh look and 
creating novel categories and concepts (Charmaz, 2006: 21:25). 
Inductive research in the social sciences can be reconciled with the apparently conflicting demands of 
a scientific tradition of ‘‘rigorous’’ theoretical advancement. To balance this frequent conflict there is 
the need to use a holistic approach to the inductive concept development (Gioia et al., 2012). The 
informants didn’t usually use the existing theory and terminology terms in their descriptions. They used 
categories of “strategic” and “political” to classify issues that demanded attention and action instead. In 
this way, I used Gioia methodology as to not miss the key aspects of their sense making (Education 
European policies), and also their sense giving (National education policies), by imposing the academ-
ic preordained understanding on their experience (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). Additionally, it is also 
a challenge to understand if the informants are lying, in a works around to protect themselves or theirs 





The data was gathered through 17 expert interviews in two rounds, first from 5 face-to-face interviews 
and second from 12 interviews by phone calls. Original data (about 126 pages of interview transcripts, 
approximately 24.706 words) analysis followed the general proposal explained by the Gioia methodol-
ogy (Gioia et al., 2012). Being a qualitative study, the main goal of the study was to explore the factors 
that influence the cofounder’s management in relation with their family-members. To address this aim, 
interviewees were addressed in an informal colloquial tone to give them enough comfort to describe 
and reflect on the experience, as well as to share and advocate their ideas and point-of-view regarding 
the company and family-members’ management contexts through structured interviews with open-
ended questions (Annex 4).   
Insider-outsider approach 
With the first round questionnaire, I aimed to find insights regarding family-members’ context, in the 
well defined and awareness family-business company, to define my questionnaire for the target group, 
entrepreneurs. I employed an insider-outsider approach (Gioia et al., 2010) to give voice to the 
knowledge from the insiders (the family-business companies), who could best articulate the rationales 
for the conceptions and actions that affected the formation and development of the new organizations, 
in the context of the entrepreneurship. The 4 members of the family-company provided several insight-
ful commentaries throughout the findings in the role of insiders, in the context of people’s interaction 
into the family-company. 
Sample and procedure 
All interviews in the two rounds were conducted in an appropriate time, scheduled by the interviewees 
themselves, were audio-recorded, and were transcribed verbatim. In the first round of interviews, I did 
the first 5 interviews (three males and two female) after arrangement with the company board and the 
interviews were conducted at the headquarters of the company. In the first round interviews, they rep-
resented a founder, a non-board family-member, two employees and a General Secretary of the Por-
tuguese Family-business Association. At the beginning of the interviews, I explained the context of the 
interview following the questionnaire, question by question.  
In the second round, I did 12 interviews, respondents (twelve males) were all cofounders with an ex-
ecutive management position, at the moment, in the companies. Except one interviewee, they belong 
to Generation Y, X and Millennial, with an age range from 35 to 60 (mean: 43). They represented en-
trepreneurs and investors. The phone calls sample were purposefully restricted, as I was interested in 
reaching specific cofounders experiences and external factors, which involve cofounder’s family-
members. In phone round interviews, a first phone call explained the goals for the interview and asked 
interviewee to schedule the interviews. In the second call, if the interview was not conducted in the 
first call, the interview ran, question by question.  
Change in progress 
I used a semi-structured expert interview, but never lost the focus in the research question. This re-
search was prepared to be open to adjustments during the development. This flexibility gave me the 




the interview plan was designed for entrepreneurs, but during the process it was relevant to include 
financial investors and a specific set of questions to them. Moreover, informants reveal how they are 
concern about their proprietary information. As one key informant said for the Gioia study, “I’ll tell you 
anything you want to know, so long as you don’t embarrass me.” (Gioia et al., 2012). Exploring life 
disruptions or stigmatized behaviors may raise questions of being intrusive. During the process, I ad-
justed my interview questions, when I initially asked for a “personal conflict”, because the interviewees 
worked around the question and avoid answering to the embarrassing context of it. In that way, this 
flexibility gave me the possibility to go back to the question in a different perspective, exploring the 
uncomfortable question in other form (Charmaz, 2006: 29:35). This agility gave me the opportunity to 
extract more insights from the interviews (Gioia et al., 2012).  
Defining the sample size 
Based on the ground theorizing (Charmaz, 2006), the number of interviews, to be conducted in the 
research, was contingent on the progress of the interviews. Expert interviews are not easy to find and 
the final number of the interviews is partially subjective, but can be theoretically supported in the ful-
fillment of the clusters, when an additional finding will be of no relevant added-value. I used line-by-
line coding, which means naming each line of the written interview (Charmaz, 2006). 
Data sorting and analysis 
Gioia methodology was used to organize and construct conceptual meaning. The aggregation dimen-
sions were identified through a three-step procedure, where the 1st-order analysis, which tries to 
maintain as much as possible the informant terms, tries lightly to identify concepts, so it promotes an 
explosion of the number of concepts at the first stage of the study. The 2nd-order analysis is now 
clearly in the theoretical realm, asking the emerging themes suggested by the concepts that might 
support the study to describe and explain the phenomena that it is observed. These processes show a 
smaller number of themes, as the first concepts were organized into encompassing themes 
(Patvardhan et al., 2015). According to the methodology, after a workable set of themes and concepts 
is on hand, it is the moment to investigate whether it is possible to distill the emergent 2nd-order 
themes even further into 2nd-order “aggregation dimension”. This methodology is presented in a tree-
column figure (Annex 1), in order to support and help the analysis, which facilitates the emergence of 
the relations and characteristics that were presented by the informant’s language (Gioia et al., 2012). 
Following this methodology, the main goal of the study is presented, which is reached by reducing the 
significant amount of superficial information into the essential, non-visible, and abstract deep core. 
Coincident with the data collection and after the initial stages of the analysis, I started cycling between 
emerging data themes, concepts, dimensions and relevant literatures, not only to find previous stud-
ies, but also whether I found new interpretations (Gioia et al., 2012). 
Findings 
The nepotism is a common hiring mechanism policing in family business, although cronyism as being 
less common (Jones and Stout, 2015). Findings goes to understand influences of entrepreneurship 




extend-household, nepotism and cronyism concepts explored, findings start to explore the motivation 
of governmental policies over the entrepreneurship education and the implications over education 
programs. After, considering the Nepotism/cronyism entrepreneurship model (Annex 2), the review 
goes to venturing capitalist, business cycles, stewardship/agency and household analyses, because 
their impact on the concept definition of nepotism and cronyism. 
The impact of the knowledge-based economy on the entrepreneurship education 
As a sense making, the Lisbon European Council (2000) brought critical ambitious policies for entre-
preneurship education programs, education information and communication technologies, research 
and development, economy competitiveness, purchasing power and consumptions to develop the 
knowledge-based economy, replying to the reveals that Karagiannis shows in his study (Karagiannis, 
2007). Regarding governmental incentives, European Commission since 2000 is incentivizing (sense 
making) European countries to promote the European knowledge economy to be more competitive 
and dynamic in the global world (European Council, 2000). Concerning the national education pro-
gram for entrepreneurship into the schools (PNEE), Portugal began to privilege knowledge and inno-
vation, to promote entrepreneurial education and to create infrastructures to foster entrepreneurship, 
although education appears as an essential way to achieve the goals of the program (Teixeira, 2012). 
The interviews reflected the consequences of those implemented policies as mentioned by Miguel 
Barbosa, “The start-up market is growing and we never had such a well assembled ecosystem.” and 
highlighted by Miguel Henriques that "In Portugal, it's too early to evaluate the impact of the entrepre-
neurship education". Also referred by the PNEE program, the actual situation of the schools and edu-
cation curricula already comprises the conditions to promote the program. Although an entrepreneur 
education depends essentially on the will, investment, and openness of a new form of work, and to a 
new attitude in all educative agents (Pereira et al., 2007).  
Apart from the regulated education, Portugal has others institutes and promoters to foster entrepre-
neurship. For example, ANJE has counted more them 58 institution, with entrepreneurship programs 
and the entrepreneurship education evolution in Portugal is aligned since 2000 with the PNEE from 
the kindergartens colleges to universities and also in private and social initiatives (Alípio, 2006). Re-
garding incubators, ANJE also reported that there are promoters, counted 30 organizations in 2006, 
with real incentives of entrepreneurship in Portugal, such as accelerators and incubators. Incubators 
deliver incentives for new entrepreneurs through education programs, networking, resources, and 
investment partners. They have work-guidelines for the startups companies, to frame how the promot-
ers should do to be evaluated by the investors, when promoters submit their project to the calls. Those 
criteria align the company with constraints to fill particular requirements. For example, Startup Lisboa 
call regulations incentive that applicants come with structures that reply to the multi-skill team. Addi-
tionally, DNA Cascais also look for agile partners. Also according to Portugal Ventures Calls, regula-
tions for application admission consider cofounders and governance requirements considerations for 
the new companies. Miguel Henriques mentioned that “One of the things investors look into and dis-
cuss when investing in a startup is precisely the nature of its cofounders. Why are they on the project 
and their commitment level. Therefore, it’s fundamental for us to have not only the founder, but a team 




common practice to add some clauses stating that the cofounders have to remain attached to the pro-
ject for a certain period, as a condition to go ahead with the (investment) operation.” 
In consequence of European Commission incentives, Portugal developed a National Education Pro-
gram for entrepreneurship that developed the new perspective of the entrepreneurship education eco-
system in Portugal (Pereira et al., 2007). It is relevant for this paper that organizations which promote 
the entrepreneurship incentive a team of cofounders to address the challenge of the venture, concerns 
nepotism and cronyism on the cofounders and team capital. 
Impact of the entrepreneurship education over startups' creation 
Entrepreneurship education aggregated dimensions led me to understand if the entrepreneurial edu-
cation foster ventures, in contrast with the time when there wasn’t any entrepreneurial education offer.  
In the common sense, it is still said that entrepreneurs are born, not made (Southerst, 2014), as men-
tioned interviewee João Ferro Rodriguez “I am very skeptical about the education for entrepreneur-
ship. It’s a down side from trying to reach everyone. The truth is that not everyone was born or raised 
with the interpersonal or resilience skills for this kind of activity. That generates a lot of frustration, and 
since many people are not aware of this and decide to become entrepreneurs. If they made an exer-
cise on introspection and self-analyses, the first answer they would get is that they shouldn’t go for it.” 
This brings the elementary question about the consequence of the entrepreneurship education, “Can 
the entrepreneurship course improve the entrepreneurial intentions of students?” that lead me to the 
research from Chen, based in an experimental teaching that lasted for 18 weeks and was controlled 
by adopted pre-test and post-test. During the experimental study, in addition to the lectures from the 
instructor, an experimented entrepreneur speaker was invited to be a mentor co-teacher. In one hand, 
they found high satisfaction and better learning efficacy about the content and teaching process. In the 
other hand, they found that the entrepreneurial intention of the students had not been improved. How-
ever, the study denotes that in the entrepreneurship courses, students understand better if they were 
“born” to follow an entrepreneurial career. Moreover, these education courses do not teach students 
how to be an entrepreneur, however they are able to apply the learned subject in their future jobs. In 
the opposite, with this entrepreneurial career lost intention, mentor co-teaching raise the satisfaction 
and the learning efficacy in the students during the course. Students become more aware about the 
challenges related with being an entrepreneur (Chen et al., 2015).  
Those findings are corroborated by João Ferro Rodrigues "All this entrepreneurship education offers 
are very positive tools for people who have an entrepreneurial character, however it can develop a 
negative impact, produce entrepreneurs, it doesn’t exist. And the problem today is this exaggerated 
entrepreneurial trend. What it does not matter, there are people who have the profile of teachers, other 
have higher risk as a profile of entrepreneurship, others are more conservative and have tendency to 
do work as an employee, does not bring any harm. Not all people have to be entrepreneur. I would 
say that the first derivative of entrepreneurship be taught in schools is positive, because it gives tools 
to those who already have this pre-release, helps shorten way.". 
According to Zider, education institutions are more structured to help people to find new ideas than 




have limitation because of their strategic plan, team profile and financial structure in opposition to the 
venture capitalists, which are focused in entrepreneurship investment (Zider, 1998). 
Regarding the selection for the entrepreneurship courses, the interviewee Miguel Barbosa stressed 
that “Segregation of students for this courses is a very important issue, but to that I have no answer. 
An entrepreneur is born or trained as such? I think that in the end is a bit of both. Some people have it 
on their DNA and some don’t. Even if you are an entrepreneur you may need to acquire those skills.”  
In other perspective, regarding to the "consumers" of the entrepreneurship education, Wylie research 
said “Proponents claim that a daily dose of computer games can make you more focused, boost 
memory and processing speed, quicken your decision-making, and improve your problem-solving 
ability”. The new generations, including new entrepreneurs, are using the easily available information 
with more independency, which give them more autonomy to choose their path and grave new ways 
to fill their goals, in private, professional and social life (Wylie, 2011). According to Cheng research, 
recent entrepreneur courses adapted their programs for the new reality of the knowledge-based econ-
omy. In entrepreneurship education programs, the most common method is via lectures with more 
interactive approach, by using case studies, guest speakers and interaction with successful entrepre-
neurs (Cheng et al., 2009). Interviewee Miguel Henrique mentioned that “The teaching focused on 
entrepreneurship allows certainly for an entrepreneur’s culture and spirit, and seems to have a positive 
impact for those with an entrepreneur’s spirit. In Portugal, we had a long time apart and our culture is 
not entrepreneurial, I think the impact is very positive, because we more easily grasp hold of innova-
tions and fashion, I think we can have a very positive impact.” 
 Southerst supports that education institutes saw an opportunity to provide tools and environment to 
facilitate and promote entrepreneurship. Also mentioned that educators said that even the participants 
who do not turn into an entrepreneurs can benefit from the experience received in the entrepreneurial 
program as a foundation for a career, "Students going out into industry are going to be expected to be 
more entrepreneurial in their roles” and “Learning how to start and run a business feeds a natural in-
clination to find new ways of doing things, and that is invaluable in the work world today", said by Tan-
ya McDonald from Centre for Innovation at Alberta's Olds College (Southerst, 2014). 
In consequence, from the entrepreneurial education, co-founders acquire tools and skills that can con-
tribute to be more aware about team build, which can influence nepotism and cronyism definition. 
There was a rise of entrepreneurial courses at academic institutions, colleges and economic incen-
tives programs in Portugal. Miguel Barbosa supports by mention "Training is very important. An entre-
preneur can not only be technological, because the company does not have enough human re-
sources. The entrepreneur has to have a range of higher valences and acquire competence in entre-
preneurship schools. I subscribe to the school since 2003, postgraduate, and we see that those who 
are there absorb that information almost eagerly, because in university courses only had valences in 




The influence of venture capitalist over the management team 
Following the awareness that the entrepreneurship education programs give to the importance of the 
venture capitalists, it is important to understand the impact that venture capitalist have over the man-
agement team formation and over the human capital of the venture. 
In the venture’s early stage, according to Miguel Barbosa, “the company is commonly only a mind 
concept of the entrepreneur, who believes that he has the vision and the motivation to roll the venture 
into a successful company” and “With the arrival of the investor matters become more structured. In 
many occasions, through reports, we witness the startup necessity for consulting backup, given by 
more experienced people, namely by the independent board member (IBM), because some skills are 
scarce and others can be compensated by the resources available through the venture capitalists.”. 
However, in the following capital raise investment stages, usually venture capitals consider having 
more control over their investments in the company and, if the founder CEO doesn’t show results as 
they expect, they typically invite an external director (IBM) to join the shareholder’s assembly. Noam’s 
study shows that 20% of entrepreneurs are forced to leave the position of CEO. Founders are forced 
out of the control against their willingness and before their plan to resign (Wasserman, 2003) 
Regarding the impact of the extended-household investment, Miguel Barbosa mentioned that “It 
doesn’t always happen like that (receiving investors), it was more frequent in the past, 10 or 20 years 
ago. People were very centered in the ‘Family, Friends and Fools’, because of the initial investment 
order and execution time. Nowadays, it’s still easier to work with friends and family. However, from 
what we see, there isn’t necessarily an obligation to work with family or friends, there is a greater pro-
fessionalization of those skills. Other startup areas, if cofounders do exist , should be based on com-
petence and not friendship.”. That is aligned with Bygrave findings, early investments usually come 
from “Founders, Family, Friends and Fools” (Bygrave and William, 2004) and also Macrometria re-
ports, entrepreneurs commonly invite family-members, friend, and investors into their companies 
(Macrometria, 2014). 
About the external investor’s influence in the management of the venture, as Franke mention, solo 
founder decreases the probability of success of the venture and the cofounders team plays a key role 
in the ventures’ valuation by venture capitalists (Franke et al., 2008). Interviewee Miguel Henriques, 
said “Since business angels jump in on an embryonic stage, it has a great impact, because later on, 
with more funding needs, the way the cofounders react to this issue is very relevant. It’s jumping out of 
their comfort zone for the entrepreneurs. Preparing for the funding round it’s an important step for this 
jump, it has the impact of starting to see their own business, not through their own eyes, but from the 
outside.”. Also mentioned by Miguel Barbosa “When starting a venture, many founders realize that 
their financial resources, their ability to led and inspire people, and their passion are not enough to 
grow and capitalize all the opportunities that they envision for their project.”.  
In case of the inclusion on the shareholder’s assembly of an external investors, through an Independ-
ent Board Member, it challenges the management control of the enterprise, as mentioned by Miguel 
Barbosa. Sometimes it serves as a complement of the competences to manage the company 
(Rodriguez et al., 2009). In contrast, as an example mentioned by Ricardo Mendes, “In our case, for 




management team that has other people, who are not the cofounders, who bring experience in formal 
management of other companies, namely larger companies, banking, listed companies. Therefore, it 
prepares us for the entry, if we want to, capital without major changes in management.". 
Resuming, for investor nepotism and cronyism can be an issue. Based on Miguel Barbosa, “Family-
members and friends, which join the companies through the founders, can be a problem, because of 
the emotional attachment and loyalty towards the founder.” that highlights the concern about nepotism 
and cronyism raised by investors (Miloud et al., 2012). 
The impact of the business cycle on the extend-household human capital  
This issues can be important by understand the impact of economic cycles on the extended-
household capital that influence the concept of nepotism and cronyism.  
As mentioned by Allas, the extended-household members can be affected by the economic cycle 
(Allas, 2011). In the context of business crises, the interviewee Nuno Martins mentioned that “I would 
say that the market competitiveness and the innovation aspect are the key aspects in terms of busi-
ness survival. Obviously, like in any other business, the quality and discipline issues, the trust estab-
lished with the customers, all are very import in our activity.” 
The internal environment in the companies can be influenced by external actors, some of which are 
directly related to the business itself. There are several sectors that suffer from the economic crises, 
however there are other sectors that find opportunities to explore. Still, in global crises there were a 
higher number of companies who went in stress, because of the decrease of the natural market. This 
is the time when the company and personal resilience is put in test, especially between top managers 
and its collaborators (Baye, 2010). Miguel Henrique relates economic cycles with the market for 
startups as follows: "A depressive phase lead, due to lack of employment alternatives, the greater 
business creation. There is a whole context of support for startups. In contrast, a more recessive 
phase the market is more difficult and creates difficulties. In a growth phase, it is more difficult to mobi-
lize own entrepreneurs and social-economic ecosystem, but there is more market for startups. " 
As Parker (Parker, 2012) mentioned entrepreneurs have importance as a source of growth and recov-
ery. Business cycles explain that the economy growth oscillates around the growth rate and does not 
have a linear evolution. Those oscillations are expressed as a series of economic expansions and 
recessions. For the purpose of this study, and apart from complex and new explanations, a classic 
explanation of the four phases of the economic cycle was considered (Plosser, 1989). The expansion 
phase is when there’s economic and stock market growth. In the peak phase the economic growth 
rate falls off and markets reach the top. The recession phase follows the peak phase and it is charac-
terized by the economic contraction and with the declining of the stock markets. Finally, closing the 
cycle, there is the crisis, where there is a stock exchange breakdown and several enterprises go bank-
rupt, before rebounding into a new expansion phase. These cycles, around the four stages, can last 
from 1 to 12 years (Baye, 2010). The innovative entrepreneurs may have to consider the economic 
cycle phases to make strategic decisions and to determine when it is better to enter into the market. 
Regarding investment, Paik and Woo study explores how economic cycles affect the fluctuation of the 




In consequence, concerning the impact on extended-household knowledge capital from the business 
cycle in the productivity and the economic cycle in UK, Allas' reveals that personal skill have direct 
impact from the business cycle (Allas, 2011). The business cycle can affect the extended-household 
capital, by affecting their members. Those implications on extended-household capital can be at least 
from unemployment, lack of human and financial resources, business opportunities and education 
enrollment, which may influence opportunities of nepotism or cronyism in the venture. 
The influence of the household human capital over cofounders management 
In extended-households capital valuation, external factors have influence regarding blood and non 
blood members’ formation, interaction and structure (Distelberg and Sorenson, 2009).  
Following the impact of the business cycle in extended-household, the paper “Stand together or 
alone?”, explores the relationship between business cycle fluctuations and family formation and struc-
ture. They found a negative correlation where an increase in the unemployment rate is associated with 
a decrease in the numbers of marriages formed per thousand single females each quarter. Other find-
ing of this study was related to the relation of the marital status and family type. They show that the 
relevance of the economic cycle varies substantially by age group. In the group of 25 to 44 years old, 
there is a significant expansion in single parents with children under 18 when unemployment rate in-
creases. Among the 35 to 54 years old group, there is a relevant rise in those living alone. Also found 
some evidence of elder parents joining the households of the group of 45 to 54 years old and young 
adults (from 18 to 24) remaining with their single parents in the period of the recessions. And general-
ly, they found evidences that a decline in marriages during recessions seem to be driven by a decline 
in remarriages rather than a decline in the first marriages (Ariizumi et al., 2015).  
And according to Gersick, the business develops in a three-dimensional model, each of the dimen-
sion, shareholders, families and business, have slightly differences, the pace and pattern of develop-
ment over time is different among them, behaviors that are usually the root of the organization con-
flicts, specially in business economical cycles (Gersick et al., 1997). As noted by interviewee Victor 
Ferreira one difficult moment in a company management, “I have a company now with a family, where 
I am partner with my father. The main difficulty is the management itself of the business and there are 
numerous different difficult episodes. They always involve decision-making with regard to growth or 
business opportunities that the company itself may have. Not always the partners are in line and this 
leads, from both sides, to that person or choose to opt in or out by that business. Thus, they are more 
difficult situations, the experience I have, are always the most difficult situations to manage.”. 
Regarding decision makers, Davis shows the importance of the right and fast action to respond to a 
situation (Davis and Lawrence, 1978). When the recession phase of the economic cycle begins, deci-
sions makers, in the companies who have a negative impact, may become significantly bothered by 
conflicts among subordinates as well as by the delay in decisions taken by the structure to respond to 
the negative business environmental situation (Morris et al., 1994). Also, stressed by Victor Ferreira, 
“In my opinion, the top management structure should act quickly over the business and should think 




In another interview, Sergio Teixeira described his experience, when he worked in the same company 
as his father. A company where it’s common practice that son and father usually don’t work in the 
same team in order to manage conflicts. Sérgio Teixeira said “Parents and sons do not work together, 
because there is a certain aversion to work in the same workplace.” and he reply to the question “-Did 
you work directly with your father? – No, on the contrary. That was more or less common practice, 
myself or other people, that we know that came to work in the institute and had our parents working 
there as well, always worked in different areas than our family.”. 
Resuming, when nepotism and cronyism are involved, extended-household capital can bring consid-
erations on group formation, conflict management, opportunity of team building or decision making 
that can influence in the cofounder management of the firm. 
Impact of stewardship and agency on company human capital 
Addressing the self-interest and commitment of co-founders that usually incorporate family and friends 
members on the venture (Bygrave and William, 2004) can be valuable for the understanding the man-
agement and employees team formation. 
The research reveals that agent and stewardship have mixed feelings among interviewees. In agency 
conflict, Victor Ferreira said that “So, if I’m here with my colleague, where both of us have decision 
capabilities, but different visions, we argue, we justify our points of view, and we go home, win or lose, 
we go each other our own way. When it involves family is always different, we do not go each one to 
his side, because we have one too intense life beyond our work and sometimes a decision or disa-
greement can take also, ultimately to a quarrel or a bore in the relationship beyond professional as-
pects. And that makes a lot worse things than if is an unfamiliar company.”. He also expressed a 
stewardship concept among family-business, “Family businesses are short of processes, but more 
bitterly than large companies.”. In conflict management involving nepotism, João Duque Vieira re-
ferred that "In a conflict perspective, I already passed several times through it. I have been through 
many times by envy and like that, because there are people who for some reason, because things are 
more complicated or because they do not understand the whole story now, do not understand why 
sometimes I can better treat my wife (partner) for some reason than to give to someone else. ".  
Another important factor is related to the utility function in the economic model, where economists say 
welfare of individuals is positively linked to the welfare of others, like parents that are generous to their 
children. It also incentives family-members to be considerate with each other and care for each one in 
case of need, even if they have to sacrifice the corporation (Schulze et al., 2001). Moreover, this situa-
tion includes also family-members when they have to interact professionally and influence on the 
business, as disserted in the paper “Executive compensation in family firms”. In this study, the authors 
found that a decrease on performance in the corporate governance, and a relevant splitting of the 
control of the company by other family-members, has a negative impact in other family-members con-
cerning compensations (Cheng et al., 2015). 
Resuming, considering that startups usually involve extend-household members, stewardship and 
agency factors can influence employees’ commitment, team performance or conflict management that 




highlight the principal-agent model, which have a relevant impact on corporation governance policies, 
based on M. Jensen publication “Self-interest, altruism, incentives, and agency” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
The impact of cronyism and nepotism on cofounders company management 
The stimulus that cofounders and top managers can receive comes from all around, like internal and 
external factors that can impact the business. For example: from its role in the company, from the 
person itself, from their friends, from their family-members or from the factors above analyzed.  
The extension of the definition of family boundaries, Distelberg brings some friend to a close level as 
family-members in the company management context (Distelberg and Sorenson, 2009). As docu-
mented in “Executive compensation in family firms”, in contrast with the shareholder who controls the 
company, other family-members that have shares in the company may have different goals. Chang 
mentions that in a family-business contract situation, agreements can be away from an economic rea-
soning. Family interaction usually has irrational consequences, such as sibling rivalry and generation 
envy. Family rivalry can influence negatively the corporate governance system. Those conflicts among 
family-members may influence the formulation and implementation of the compensation plan (Cheng 
et al., 2015).  
Can this factor have impact on cofounder management decisions, specially from cronyism and nepo-
tism pressure? The interviewee Sérgio Teixeira mentioned it in the reply to the question “Did that 
(nepotism) harm the productivity and profitability of the company? - This cases I know are cases 
where the progress based on merit and the choice of the best candidate to perform certain functions 
were hurt by the presence of persons whose family ties protected them and therefore the direct con-
sequence is that the company is loosing with that, because it doesn’t have the best people in those 
positions, it has those who inherited them.”. 
Miller shows the influence of the family-members in the leading of the company, in "Siblings and suc-
cession in the family business", he describe a situation where the founder and his succession is a 
challenge (Miller, 1998). Miller also stressed the influence of the non-executive family-members in the 
decision of the management board by the Benson wife and son (Miller, 1998). According to Cheng, 
management decision activity is harder to prevent when there is more than one family-member in-
volved in the company. Moreover, inefficiency can be the result of family ownership, such as recruiting 
a family executive when he is not the best option or from hiring an incompetent family executive or 
offering company resources to family-members with no justification (Cheng et al., 2015).  
Avoiding the nepotism conflict by family employment, João Pedro Rodrigues said: "We are 15 people 
(in the company) and has never happen nor never put on the table the possibility. I myself now have 
thought and have considered the case of my wife, who is a professional business development and 
could do well a certain function, but I personally, being general director of the company, I think it 
makes no sense, and does not seem to the phase in which the company is, not being a family-
oriented company and having external shareholders with 60% share in the company. I think it would 
be something wrong. And also by personal issues, like split life contexts and also did not seem an 




principle, there is nothing written in stone. Never happened to relatives of other cofounders. And I 
have the active participation in fact, I've thought of that possibility, but I ended up abdicating it, but for 
reasons of my balancing personal and professional life." 
 
Additionally, in the ”Are family firms really superior performers?” paper, Danny Miller shows a pertinent 
difference between solo-founder and a multi-family-member corporate because ownership of other 
family-members can promote a source of conflict, such as over control into the family company (Miller 
et al., 2007). Accordingly, to Jensen, in one hand, solo-owner management not only reduces the effec-
tiveness of external control mechanisms, but also they expose companies to a closed control problem 
created by owners’ incentives, which take own-managers to act not exclusively in benefit of the corpo-
ration. In the other hand, a low performance in a family business with multi owners can suggest that 
those founders and their family-member partners may not share the same vision and can accumulate 
several conflicts of interest. A family-member who holds a large share of the company may incentive 
the founder to magnify his power and influence in the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As Vic-
tor Ferreira mentioned in his interview, he experienced this problem when he had to adjust the better 
proposal for the company only to keep healthy the extra-work personal relation that he had with an-
other family-member who had half of the company. Also José Henrique mentioned on the interview 
that “I co-founded the company, with only with 20% of it, but with the increasing of the potential of 
conflict, I agreed with my Cofounder family-member to buy shares to control the company.”.  
In company valuation perspective, Jensen documents that, when ownership is fractioned among in-
side and outside owners, agency theory supports that changes in the owner-managers incentives will 
cause the companies value to decrease, specially because executive-owners with a fraction of the 
company will only have a fraction of the cost of the benefits it receives, and this incentives partial-
owners to act opportunistically and make decision to their own benefit in opposition to the other out-
side owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1994).  
In consequence of nepotism and cronyism considerations, nepotism and cronyism can come from 
each co-founders' family and friend members. The members' boundaries limits are usually better de-
fined when involve nepotism then when involve extended-household members (nepotism and crony-
ism), where friends of each cofounder can diffuse the limits. Extended-household members can effect 
the cofounders in the company management, which can involve decision making, extended-household 
recruitment or anti-nepotism policies. 
Discussion 
The relation can be complex and opaque among extended-household members, which include co-
founders' family and friends members, specially in a work environment, and it can be difficult to under-
stand it. Nevertheless, the family definition by Distelberg’s (Distelberg and Sorenson, 2009) contribu-





First, sense making/sense giving theory tends to standardize the actions (Bartunek et al., 1999) from 
the European program (European Council, 2000; Karagiannis, 2007) and from the Portuguese educa-
tion program (Educação, 2008) in the promotion of the education entrepreneurship, which can influ-
ences the knowledge base, achievement of skills, competences and attitudes that can guidance the 
students career choices. Education can open the horizons of the students by giving them better 
equipment to perceive opportunities and risks, including regarding nepotism and cronyism pros and 
cons (Bartoš et al., 2015; Raposo and do Paço, 2011; Zider, 1998). There are several players that are 
working organized and incentivized by the Portuguese government programs (Alípio, 2006), which 
influence most of the players on the market, including education stakeholders. These activities try to 
promote methodologies and practices to push entrepreneurs’ candidates to the world of the ventures, 
and in one hand there are persons that can be traced to be an entrepreneur and in the other hand, 
there are candidates that are not fitted to be an adventurer in ventures. In overall, this factors, educat-
ed by Deductive learning process (Lansberg, 2015), can influence the perception of the cofounders in 
their ventures, where competences to roll the company, among the cofounders and employees teams, 
and performance of the company usually are in high stand of cofounders concern about the value of 
the company. This is also a key factor for ventures capitalists to invest on the company (EVCA, 2007; 
Zider, 1998). 
Second, the EU entrepreneurial education policies (2000) and actions to promote the knowledge-
based economy involve relevant stakeholders, such as government, education institutions, venture 
capitalists, startup incubators and other players (Alípio, 2006; European Council, 2000). In conse-
quence, stakeholders focus to develop the entrepreneurial talent, stimulate entrepreneurship educa-
tion in learning institutions, from kindergartens to universities. Moreover, higher learning institutions 
are now offering core entrepreneurship programs or elective courses as a major subject (Teixeira, 
2012). Considering the extended-household capital, involving cofounders' family and friends, educa-
tion programs enrollment increase during the recession phase in consequence of the poor dynamic of 
the economy and job creation. Today the education for entrepreneurial can change the way entrepre-
neurs frame their ideas into business, including the earlier consciousness selection of the stakehold-
ers and shareholders, among family members, friends and external investors. Entrepreneurship edu-
cation can have an impact towards entrepreneur intention and entrepreneur careers (Ramayah et al., 
2012). The entrepreneur education programs give to students an opportunity to develop their skills, 
attributes and behaviors to improve their chances to the success (Kirby, 2004). Moreover, more higher 
learning institutions are offering entrepreneurship programs, as elective courses or as a major subject 
(Teixeira, 2012), which may enhance the influence of the entrepreneurship education over the percep-
tion of the venture capitalists, management team configuration, and business cycle among the 
knowledge-based economy stakeholders.  
Considering that entrepreneurial courses are open for all, we could consider that having a business 
degree is optional for those that don’t desire to have a position in an established company, however 
this may influence the entrepreneurship growth curve. The framework to build a company, that we can 
have access through one of the entrepreneurship promoters, rise questions that before the movement 




building, employment policy, exit plan, demand criteria for partners selection to launch the company, 
investment request, and others. These influence how extended-household members are selected in 
the team building to achieve the goal of the venture, contributing to shape the dimension of the influ-
ence of the nepotism and cronyism. A fact that was evident in the interviewees was that, who started 
the companies without the support of a proper education in entrepreneurship, usually didn’t develop 
an exit plan and business governance documents, yet. Nevertheless, some interviewees already have 
an idea in mind about the subject. In other way, startups that pass-through an entrepreneurial educa-
tion can have those points in the to do list and in the business plan, since the early stage of their ven-
ture. It is also important to consider that the impact that inductive learning process is having the 
knowledge-based economy, where everyone can have access to the information through internet and 
own experiences, and they may plan their new experiences and reflections in their pace.  
Third, regarding external investors findings, company growth can be painful and the founder and his 
close employees, including family-members, can be under pressure. Usually, founders have insights 
about the opportunities and have the specific knowledge to conceive a disruptive idea of a product, 
service or business model that can raise the share-value between its ventures and the target custom-
ers. Entrepreneurs build a team to develop the opportunity according to their vision and usually they 
develop a strong connection with those first collaborators, which usually is the base of the organiza-
tional culture of the company where his personality and preferences are reflected. The faster founders 
call for outside founders and new management skills, the quicker they can start loosing management 
control. When investors plan to change the control of the company, employees enter in special ac-
count, because any modification can affect the motivation of the founder. The possible change in the 
management board can directly affect the dynamics of the founder’s nepotism and cronyism influence, 
and in the limit it can encourage them to leave the company. It can reflect directly into the risk and the 
performance of the company and its financial results, to which investors are very sensitive. 
Enterprises evolution can involve changes in their control, mostly by external investors, and it usually 
reflects in the continuity of the founder in the control as a CEO. This can be reflected directly in the 
position, networking and power of the founder extended-household members and put them out of the 
“family” succession. Entrepreneurship education program bring awareness to entrepreneurs regarding 
the relation with the venture capitalists when they are starting a business and the lack of resources to 
run and grow to a successful business. Therefore, entrepreneurship education makes entrepreneurs 
better equipped to better plan and handle the transitions resulting from external investors. 
Fourth, the findings regarding the influence of the economic cycle reveals that, independently of 
whether the business of the company usually is running aligned or against the economic cycle or 
against the cycle, it is worth mentioning that companies are willing to observe inefficiencies in their 
business cycle expansion phases and are forced to improve its results in its businesses recession 
phases. Business cycles can influence directly the investment, where the relation among sectors in 
the market determines the best phase of the economic cycle to invest on it, resulting on an investment 
cycle (Allas, 2011). Investment cycles commonly have a strong relation with business cycles and with 
business sector, where investors influence the availability the stock of financial services in the market 




labor force, and specially in extended-household members, could live in a professional, financial and 
psychological pressure, and weak links between personal increase their relation tension, which influ-
ence their decision ability, special in the management of the workforce appraisal when involving ex-
tended-household members. All these considerations usually are addressed in the entrepreneurship 
education programs, which give a better understanding about the relation of the business and eco-
nomic cycles with the venture. In other way, research reveals that during the economic cycles reces-
sion phases enrollment increases, comparing with other phases of the cycle. 
Lastly, concerning the family-members and friend influence, even when the companies interviewed 
were not deeply sensitive to the process of succession or selling the firm, the relation to other mem-
bers of the extended-household was present among the questions answered by the interviewees. The 
relation between family-members and friends, and cofounders can be as difficult to describe as the 
term family, however Distelberg research contributes with above cited definition of family, where in 
certain conditions friends can be included. Crocetti and Meeus contribution reveals that the relational 
system of the Italian emerging adults not only considers relationships with their family but also with 
friends (Crocetti and Meeus, 2014). These findings suggest that friends and family-members might be 
relevant as a resource in a venture by entrepreneurs and highlight the important of nepotism and cro-
nyism topics. In economics theory, the utility function can also apply here. Business education offer 
information to understand how to relate between owners and family members and friends, increasing 
trust and lowering the agency costs that plague these relationships (Lansberg, 2015).  
Their actual situation as cofounders, shareholders are framed in family-business studies related with 
the principal-agency/stewardship problem and nepotism/cronyism fitted in this section. A principal-
agency problem that is addressed in this section and supported in the studies used reveals that a 
shareholder that has the control over the company may influence the executive compensation or deci-
sion. This influence may reflect also in benefit of cofounders and their extended-household members 
that works or not in the company. As Victor Ferreira said, in his venture with his father, the relation 
sun-father can promote decisions that were not the best for the company. 
Cofounders may incentive extended-household members to provide privilege focus and to take care of 
each one in case of need, even if they have to sacrifice the corporation (Schulze et al., 2001). Or, in 
opposite, cofounders sacrifice the household-members to reduce the risk of agency problem or prac-
tice stewardship to differentiate and bring value by commitment. In analogy of Jaskiewicz’s two types 
of nepotism (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013) and considering cronyism among cofounders which are not fami-
ly-members, I considered reciprocal cronyism related with three conditions: interdependence, extent of 
exchanges and, eventual, cofounders’ agreement. Among cofounders, these conditions can lead also 
to “generalized social exchange relationships”, which are relevant to effective “tacit knowledge man-
agement”, which can also enhance general company competitive advantage. In opposite, entitlement 
cronyism happened without concerns of Cofounders’ agreement. This can lead to “restricted social 
exchanges” among cofounders, which can miss synergies among cofounders. Principal-agent theory 
addresses management decisions that are influenced by the ownership status of the decision makers 




only financial and nonfinancial benefits, but also the capability to exercise authority, dictate strategy, 
and select investments where the company will invest. 
Finally, regarding nepotism and cronyism, in my research I didn’t find any reference in entrepreneur-
ship education programs that explicit address nepotism or cronyism aspects. Nepotism or Anti-
nepotism concept is usually converged in family-business education programs and enterprise corpora-
tions, and it is usually included in some country govern policies, in family-business or large institution. 
Cronyism is less common in employment policies (Jones and Stout, 2015). 
Conclusion 
This study contributes to the understanding of how entrepreneurship education can influence nepotism 
and cronyism definition. The results presented here are particularly relevant to elements of society 
considering entrepreneurship education both as a provider or as recipient, to entrepreneurs with family 
and friend ties in their ventures and to academics researching on the above topics. 
The methodology taken in building this paper led to aggregated dimensions of this problem where 
other factors are also observed: the increase of the knowledge-based economy in Portugal and how 
different stakeholders are impacting it, the importance of venture capitalist in the entrepreneurship 
process and the impact of business cycles in the ventures decision making. These factors can strongly 
affect both the entrepreneurship environment and education offer, so their impact is also considered. 
The analysis of the stakeholders in the business and education environment in Portugal revealed mul-
tiple stakeholders are fostering entrepreneurship. This results in a higher exposure to not only the 
concepts and the value of entrepreneurship but also easier access to entrepreneurship education. So 
not only the number of entrepreneurs has risen in recent years, but also their education level has in-
creased, as their household social capital 
This study found that entrepreneurs with entrepreneurship education are better equipped to handling 
different business cycles and their transitions. Resulting in also having a better capacity to handle 
household balance. Additionally, it also uncovered that entrepreneurs with entrepreneurship education 
better plan companies’ growth needs and are better equipped to handle governance transitions result-
ing of changes in the companies’ equity, shareholders’ assembly. In particular, those resulting from 
the entrance of investors in the company’s equity. It was concluded in this study that such changes 
can have a negative impact on the entrepreneur and the company itself if not properly handled. Entre-
preneurs with education can be better fit to handle the transitions. 
Entrepreneurship education also has an indirect impact in nepotism and cronyism on cofounders' rela-
tionship. This study supports that it contributes to entrepreneurs have more awareness about nepo-
tism among cofounders, and also employees, family-members and cronyism among cofounders 
friends. With proper education, entrepreneurs can start earlier to understand the implication to well 
select the partners for the venture to address competences needed for the company, in the present 





The observed impact of the entrepreneurship education led to the creation of an Nepotism/cronyism 
entrepreneurship Model (Annex 2) which aims to identify the relations between the different aggregat-
ed dimensions and the ventures outcomes. 
In conclusion, I consider that entrepreneurship education as a positive impact on the governance and 
practices of new ventures, and can be a driver to change indirectly the definition of nepotism and cro-
nyism among Cofounders. However, support in this research, I’m convict that can be add-value to 
include explicit the nepotism and cronyism into the entrepreneurship education programs. Entrepre-
neurship educated entrepreneurs tend to reflect employment policies that take in consideration nepo-
tism and cronyism. And tend to define methodologies and processes with the same goals. Additional-
ly, entrepreneurship education also has positive impact in other aspects of the lifecycle of a venture, 
like managing company transitions and business cycles, and the entrepreneur household balance.  
Future research  
The findings open a number of opportunities for further research on the implication of the entrepre-
neurship education over the entrepreneurial extended-household capital concept, where the nepotism 
and cronyism definitions are key factors. During the construction of this paper, challenges emerged to 
articulate the relation between nepotism, cronyism, entrepreneurship education, venture capitalists 
and business cycles. A further in-depth analysis of the impact of entrepreneurship education in each of 
these individual factors would help to better understand the dynamics of the problem studied in this 
paper, and enrich the knowledge of the entrepreneurship in the current landscape where entrepre-
neurship education is increasingly more available.  
This paper suggests an Nepotism/cronyism entrepreneurship Model (Annex 2), further research in 
different perspective can use the same model and explore other possible extensions of this study.  
In one hand, one interesting aspect for future research that emerged from this paper is the comparison 
of the family-based companies’ employee practices – namely giving a higher importance to individuals 
over some company goals – to the latest trends in the best performing companies of highly valuating 
individuals over short term goals. In the other hand, another interesting synergy for future research 
that emerged from this paper is the contribution that nepotism understanding, that family-business 
research has, can be extended by, complementary research, in the into the entrepreneurship ecosys-
tem. This can be by the contribution to extend the understand of nepotism and cronyism among entre-
preneurs, and to contribute to complement new entrepreneurship education programs with nepotism 
and cronyism. 
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Data Structure – Aggregate Dimensions 
 
Figure 1 - Entrepreneurship education dimension 
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Entrepreneurship education model 
 





Expert interviewees table 
# Interviewee Position Company 
F1 Carlos José Cofounder; CEO; Bachelor degree degree 
Conceito 
F2 Nuno Martins Manager; Bachelor degree 
F3 Álvaro Gomes Manager; Bachelor degree 
F4 Vanessa José 
Family-member; Manager; Bachelor de-
gree 
1 Jorge Lourenço Cofounder; CEO; (Bachelor degree) First Rule 
2 Artur Pegas 
Cofounder; General Director; Master de-
gree 
Papa-Léguas 
3 Ricardo Mascarenhas Family-member founder; Master degree Climax 
4 José Henriques Cofounder; CEO; Bachelor degree MagnumCap 
5 Ricardo Mendes Cofounder; CMO; Master degree Tekever 
6 Sérgio Teixeira Cofounder; COO; PhD degree Baseform 
7 Victor Ferreira Cofounder; CEO; Bachelor degree ControlGo 
8 Theo Fernandes Cofounder, General director; Master de-
gree 
Chimp 
9 João Duque Vieira Cofounder, CEO; Master degree; MBA Nextway Group 
10 João Ferro Rodrigues Cofounder, CEO; Bachelor degree; MBA Sabe Online 
11 Miguel Henriques President; Master degree Federação Nacional 
de Business Angel 
12 Miguel Barbosa Financial Senior Analyst;  Master degree Portugal Ventures 






The open-ended interview protocol 
An open-end interview protocol was used in the research based on the list of main question. Consider-
ing the major goals of the study and the profile of the interviewees, the expert interviews was conduct-
ed in a semi-structured to give flexible to leverage the potential of the specific knowledge of each in-
terviewees, which as its own expertize and experience. 
Semi-structured expert interviews questionnaire for entrepreneurs 
What can you tell me about your experience with family business corporation, personal and profes-
sional? 
In the early stage of the company, how do you describe what were your considerations of the integra-
tion of cofounders’ family-member into your business? 
How can you describe me the HR management process that involves cofounders’ family-members? 
Can you describe any conflict episode or management hard moment issue that involved a cofounder 
family-member? 
What can you tell about your perspective concerning your company and family business? 
What is your opinion regarding actual scenario related family business companies in Portugal? 
What is your opinion regarding Portuguese family business Association? 
What concerns do you have on cofounders regarding family cofounder’s integration in the business 
structure? 
What you can you tell me about your Exit Plan regarding cofounder succession? 
What you can tell me about Economic cycle and human resource management? 
Semi-structured expert interviews questionnaire for investors 
What you can say about the concept of a new venture and its entrepreneur? 
In your experience, how can you describe about the skills of the new entrepreneur and their execution 
plan? 
What you can say about the organization culture and the personality of the founder? 
And what is your opinion about their emotional attachment? 
What is the impacts that you figure out when startups face when investors went in? 
How can you describe the impact of the Economic cycle in the venture? 
 
